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This paper revisitates the effects of aid on 
governance from a different prospect, by 
upholding  that  aid  unpredictability  can 
potentially  increase  corruption  in 
recipient  countries  through  increased 
incentives from political leaders that are 
risk averse and corrupt, to engage in rent-
seeking activities. Empirical investigation 






1984-2004  provides  supportive  evidence 
that  higher  aid  unpredictability  is 
associated  with  more  corruption  as 
measured  by  a  synthetic  index. 
Coherently  with  some  studies,  we  also 
found that aid dependency is on average 
associated  with  less  corruption.  These 
findings  are  a  supplementary  advocacy 
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International  recent  initiatives  called  aid  donors  community  to  urgently  increase  Official 
Development Assistance flows to allow poor countries to reach the Millenium Development 
Goals (MDGs). In 2007 (the midway through the 15-year-long process of achieving the so-
called MDGs), mid-term reviews of these goals stressed that a significant number of countries 
were way off the expected results and that there was an absolute necessity to bring aid flows 
to higher levels. Also through international committments like the Paris declaration on aid 
effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action (recently adopted at the Accra High Level 
Forum  on  Aid)  donors  countries  pledged  to  make  aid  more  effective  through  a  better 
coordination of donors, a better ownership of by recipient countries, a better alignment of aid 
interventions with national development strategies, a better results-based management of aid, 
a  better  mutual  accountability  on  results  achieved.  The  Accra  Agenda  for  Action  also 
importantly stressed the need to improve other aspects of the quality of the management of 
aid,  aiming  at  increasing  the  medium-term  predictability  of  aid.  Aid  volatility  and 
unpredictability issues are indeed of crucial importance for the MDGs. Till now, aid has been 
widely  volatile  and  unpredictable
1. In comprehensive reviews of aid volatily, Bulir and 
Hamann (2001, 2003), Bulir and Lane (2002) strongly evidenced that aid is highly volatile, 
with coefficients of variation exceeding those of fiscal revenues of aid. Vargas (2005) 
provided the evidence for Sub-Saharan Africa that aid flows are fives times more volatile than 
GDP and seven times more volatile than OECD countries’ GDP. The work of Pallage and 
Robe (2001) also evidenced that aid is more volatile than the revenue of developing countries, 
while Fielding and Mavrotas (2005) provided supportive evidence that  programme aid  is 
more volatile than project aid . 
 
According to a growing body of research examining aid flows instability issues, predictability 
of overall aid and of various types of aid is a significant and potentially costly problem in 
aiddependent  countries.  In  general,  aid  commitments  exceed  aid  disbursements  and  the 
formers  are  known  to  be  bad  predictors  of  the  laters  (Bulir  and  Hamann,  2001).  Aid 
predictability issues have attracted some research interest in recent years, to document the 
extent  of  its  implication  for  development  programs  and  macroeconomic  management  in 
recipient countries. According to OECD (2008), less then 50 percent of committed aid is on 
average  delivered  on  schedule.  Celasun  and  Walliser  (2008)  found  significant  absolute 
deviations between commitments and disbursements. They also evidenced that aid flows are 
less predictable in countries weakly covered by IMF programs (which is a proxy of a stable 
country environment). The work of Fielding and Mavrotas (2005) confirmed that aid flows 
are unpredictable and that this lack of predictability is related to the type of aid, programmatic 
aid being more unpredictable that project aid. From a macroeconomic prospect, the lack of aid 
predictability
2
 can have some adverse consequences in aid-dependent countries. One of the 
main consequences of aid unpredictability is that it makes fiscal planning and implementation 
of a recipient country’s development agenda extremely difficult, since aid commitments have 
shorter terms than governments’ development planning. Aid predictability also makes much 
more difficult the ownership of development programs by recipient countries since they are 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we will use the term uncertain interchangeably with unpredictable 
2 The sources of aid unpredictability are multiple. Aid can be unpredictable due to the fact that aid disbursements 
approvals  are  often  made  by  different  actors  (e.g.  ministry  vs  parliament),  creating  a  gap  between  what  is 
committed  and  what  is  really  disbursed.  The  donors’  conditions,  which  can  be  process-related  or 
policy/performance based also contribute to the lack of aid predictability. -6- 
 
relying on uncertain funds. Elsewhere, the lack of predictability of aid increases the likelihood 
of fiscal and monetary instability (Bulir and Lane, 2002). Aid unpredictability associated with 
aid pro-cyclicality also increases output volatility and end up reducing growth (Ramey and 
Ramey, 1995; Lensink and Morrissey, 2000). Lensink and Morrissey (2000) find that the 
effect of aid on growth is insignificant unless a measure of aid uncertainty is included in the 
regression, and that uncertainty about aid is detrimental to growth. 
 
This paper switches the attention from the macroeconomic effects of aid unpredictability to a 
more "political economy" approach by linking aid flows uncertainty to rent-seeking behaviors 
in  recipient  countries.  Institutional  issues  have  recently  returned  to  the  foreground  in 
economic  development  debates.  Academic  researches  have  extensively  investigated  the 
impact of aid on the quality of institutions in aid-recipient countries and have focused on aid 
intensity ratios (Aid/GDP, Aid/GNP, Aid/exports, Aid/public expenditures, aid per capita, 
etc.) as measures of aid dependence. Number of them has empirically evidenced that aid is on 
average  associated  to  more  corruption  and  more  rent-seeking  activities  in  aid-recipient 
countries (Alesina and Weder, 2002; Svensson, 2000), while others has come to the opposite 
effect (Tavares, 2003).  
 
To our knowledge, no work has focused on the effects of aid flows uncertainty on recipient 
countries’ institutions.  Looking for a new  evidence of the effect  of aid on institutions in 
recipient countries, this paper switches from traditional measures of aid dependency to one 
feature of its delivery: its unpredictability. Does aid unpredictability leads to more corruption 
in aid recipeint countries? Through this core research question, the paper focuses on aid-
dependent countries and investigates whether higgher uncertainty in aid flows is associated 
with higher corruption. The basic political economy rationale is that aid flows uncertainty 
reduces the temporal horizon of the aid rent capture. Ventelou (2001) investigate the effect of 
the political survival on rent capture and concludes that the shorter is the probability of the 
political  survival,  the  greater  are the incentives of leaders (kleptocrats) to  engage in  rent 
capture. The paper uses a similar theoretical framework and explains that the greater is the 
uncertainty of future aid flows, the greater are the incentives of kleptocrat leaders to engage in 
rent-seeking in countries where institutions are weak. The paper then provides an empirical 
evaluation of these theoretical arguments, which provides supportive results. Rent-seeking is 
proxied by an index of corruption. Corruption is of course an extreme form of rent-seeking. 
Even if rent-seeking can take other forms than corruption (costs to ensure protection, costs to 
seize rents, costs to face competition, etc.), the weak availability of such data leads to use this 
proxy. Fixed effects estimations with a sample of 67 developing countries over the period 
1984-2002  confirms  that  aid  dependency  is  associated  with  less  corruption  while  aid 
unpredictability leads to more corruption. Sensitivity analysis then show that the type of aid 
matters for the nature and the size of the effect. Programmatic aid unpredictability has a 
greater negative effect on corruption than project aid unpredictability. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly presents the litterature 
on the impacts of aid on corruption. Section 3 discusses the links between aid unpredictability 
and rent-seeking behaviors. Section 4 provides the empirical evaluation. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
   -7- 
 
2 Aid dependency and corruption in the litterature 
 
The need for aid-recipient countries to have good policies and good-quality institutions in 
order to ensure a good management and a good effectiveness of aid has been a matter of 
interest of scholars and policy makers. More interestingly, the potential effect that aid could 
have on the quality of these institutions has also attracted the interest of many scholars. Even 
though  the  debate  is  still  controversial,  many  empirical  studies  have  concluded  that  aid 
dependence  can  potentially  undermine  institutional  quality,  by  weakening  accountability, 
encouraging  rent-seeking  and  corruption,  fomenting  conflict  over  control  of  aid  funds, 
siphoning  off  scarce  talent  from  the  bureaucracy,  and  alleviating  pressures  to  reform 
inefficient policies and institutions. These empirical studies have focused on several indexes 
of  institutional  quality  measuring  democracy,  governance,  corruption,  economic  liberties 
indexes, etc. (Svensson, 2000; Goldsmith, 2001; Knack, 2001; Alesina and Weder, 2002; 
McNab and Everhart, 2002; Hoffman, 2003; Tavares, 2003; Brautigam and Knack, 2004; 
Knack, 2004; FMI, 2005; Coviello and Islam, 2006; Dalgaard and Olsson, 2006). 
 
Focusing  on  the  specific  impact  of  aid  on    corruption,  some  empirical  studies  fuel  the 
controversy.  In  particular,  a  couple  of  them  have  demonstrated  that  aid  leads  to  more 
corruption  in  recipient  countries.  The  negative  impact  of  aid  on  the  quality  of  recipient 
countries’ institutions is traditionnaly paralleled with the so-called "natural resources curse 
phenomenon" in the litterature. This phenomenon explains that countries with great natural 
resources  tend  to  experience  slower  growth  rates  than  resource-poor  countries.  A  huge 
litterature provided a political economy theoretical framework to explain the resources curse, 
pointing  out  induced-rent-seeking  behaviors  as  the  main  cause
3.  Sala-i  Martin  and 
Subramanian (2003) show that natural resources appear to caus e no direct effect on growth 
while having adverse indirect effects through the weakness of institutions. Lane and Tornell 
(1996) and Tornell and Lane (1999) point out dysfunctional institutions as the source of the 
disappointing growth performances after the oil windfalls in Nigeria, Venezuela, and Mexico.  
 
They explain how the "voracity effect" (the more-than-proportional increase in redistribution 
in response to a windfall) leads to lower growth. Ades and Di Tella (1999) empirically show 
that natural  resource rents stimulate corruption among bureaucrats and politicians. Other 
things  equal,  countries  where  firms  enjoy  high  rents  (and  thus  where  bureaucrats  and 
politicians can extract them) tend to have high corruption levels. According to Torvik (2002), 
a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of rent -seekers (entrepreneurs 
engaged  in  rent  seeking)  and  reduces  the  number  of  modern  entrepreneurs  (running 
productive firms). Entrepreneurs move into rent -seeking once the profit in rent -seeking is 
higher than before the occurence of the windfall. Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004) 
provides cases studies explaining how higher resource rents make it easier for dictators to buy 
off political challengers. In the Congo the "enormous natural re source wealth including 15% 
of the world’s copper deposits, vast amounts of diamonds, zinc, gold, silver, oil, and many 
other resources [. . .] gave Mobutu a constant flow of income to help sustain his power". (p. 
171). Their work explain that resource abundance increases the political benefits of buying 
votes  through  inefficient  redistribution.  The  work  of  Leite  and  Weidmann  (1999)  also 
suggests that resource (especially minerals) rich countries tend to be more prone to rent-
                                                 
3 The "resource curse"-literature provides another kind of answers through the "Dutch-disease" phenomenon, 
well developed in Sachs and Warner (2001, 1997); natural resources abundance shifts factors of production out 
of sectors where production exhibits static or dynamic increasing returns to scale, pushing down productivity 
growth. -8- 
 
seeking and corruption, thereby decreasing the quality of government.  
 
Closer  to  our  research,  some  studies  have  concluded  that  foreign  aid  may  also  cause  a 
resource curse. Foreign aid transfers has been considered as windfalls in several other studies, 
and thus as a source of rent-seeking. The work of Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol 
(2008) interstingly points out that aid and natural resources share a common feature in the 
extent that they can both be captured by rent-seekers leaders. They are not constrained to be 
accountable with such resources as it would be the case with the resources from taxation. 
Acemoglu, Robinson, and Verdier (2004) also stress that aid and resource rents share the 
general  character  of  "windfall  gains",  which  disrupt  political  and  economic  incentives 
although some important differences can be noted between them. Dalgaard and Olsson (2006) 
also explain that aid transfers and natural resources have both the character of windfalls since 
poor countries can benefit from without much efforts and have both the ability to generate 
rent-seeking. Nonetheless, Dalgaard and Olsson (2006) discuss the differences and similarites 
between natural resource rents and foreign aid. These two resources have several different 
features. The first difference to be emphasized is that foreign aid is clearly endogeneous to the 
level  of development  (countries  with  low GDP per capita received on average more aid) 
whereas reserves of valuable natural resources are exogeneous (they are randomly allocated 
over the planet). Second, aid resources are more subject to external influence through foreign 
donors’  conditionalities
4
  and  strategic  interests,  albeit  foreign  firms  extracting  the  natural 
resources can also have a large influence in the countries. Third, the ease with which aid and 
resource rents can be captured by rent seekers and predators do differs, depending on the form 
of  aid  (microeconomic  targeting  with  a  weak  government  involvement  or  direct  budget 
support). Fourth, aid and natural resources differ in terms of the fixed costs of operation 
(relatively higher for the laters. The degree of externalities and volatility of the two resources 
is also a source of differences.  
 
Several studies provided empirical and theoretical evidence that foreign aid is associated with 
more rent-seeking activities and corruption
5. Boone (1996) analyzing the importance of the 
political regime for the effectiveness of aid programs, finds, with a panel of developing 
countries that foreign aid fails to raise the investment rate in recipient countries, becaus e aid 
resources are mostly consumed. 
 
As underlined in Economides, Kalyvitis, and Philippopoulos (2008) and Svensson (2000), the 
aid-rent-seeking  relationship  is  basically  linked  to  a  common-pool  problem,  aid  transfers 
being the common-pool resource. Competing political groups vieing for aid resources (for 
private purposes) without coordination. Svensson (1996) shows that, in countries suffering 
from  ethno-lingual  fractionalization  and  weak  political  institutions,  foreign  aid  receipts 
generate  increases  in  corruption,  implying  a  higher  rent  dissipation.  Svensson  (2000) 
evidences both theoretically and empirically that foreign aid is associated with more rent-
seeking and corruption in ethnically diverse countries (with several powerful groups). When 
there are several competing social groups with a weak incitement to cooperation, foreign aid 
increases rent dissipation. This argument was then confirmed empirically with cross-countries 
data.  
 
The theoretical model provided in Tornell and Lane (1999) predicts that the receipt of foreign 
aid leads powerful groups to increase their appropriation rates, dissipating the revenues and 
                                                 
4 Svensson (2000) also supports this point. 
5 Although a couple of studies have reached the opposite conclusion, based on empirical results, that is more aid 
leads to less corruption (McNab and Everhart, 2002; Dalgaard and Olsson, 2008; Tavares, 2003) -9- 
 
yielding in  no gain  in  welfare. Knack  (2001)  provides evidence that  higher levels  of aid 
increase the level of corruption and thus erodes the quality of governance by beign a potential 
source of rents. He provides the example of Tanzania where the increase of aid levels in the 
1970s and 80s helped enlarge a public sector and created more opportunities for corruption by 
sustainning large government subsidies to state-owned enterprises and parastatals. Using data 
from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) including two six-point scale measures of 
corruption in government and rule-of-law (reflecting the potential for rent-seeking associated 
with weak legal systems and insecure property rights), aid levels have proved to be strongly 
and negatively related to changes in corruption and rule-of-law measures. Higher aid transfers 
induces rent-seeking competition among self-interested individuals in countries with large 
public sectors (Economides, Kalyvitis, and Philippopoulos, 2008). Self-interested leaders get 
the  incentive  to  enter  a  game  of  rent-seeking  competition  and  to  extract  rents  from  aid 
resources  for  private  interests.  They  also  evidence  that  aid  generate  rent-seeking  through 
government activities that being exacerbated by a large public sector. 
 
Aid would also fuel corruption by increasing the size of resources that interest groups fight 
over (Alesina  and Weder, 2002). An increase  of  foreign aid  inflows increases  corruption 
according  to  their  findings.  Before  reaching  this  conclusion,  the  authors  succeeded  in 
demonstrating empirically that less corrupt government do not significantly receive more aid 
transfers and that donors do not discriminate against corrupt government, although different 
behaviors have been discovered between some of them. These last findings partly explain the 
persistence of the rent-seeking behaviors related to foreign aid. 
 
 
3 Aid flows uncertainty and rent extraction 
 
How  aid  flows  uncertainty  could  explain  rent-seeking  behaviors  and  corruption  from 
"kleptocrats"  leaders?  The  question,  while  not  looking  new,  has  not  yet  been  explicitely 
adressed  in  the  political  economy  litterature  of  aid.  There  is  a  huge  political  economy 
litterature on aid  and  endogeneous  political  leaders behaviors.  However, as  shown in  the 
previous section, this litterature has focused only on the level of aid flows, investigating the 
impact on rent-seeking behaviors. This paper incorporates a risk factor in the analysis, that is 
the  effect  of  aid  flows  uncertainty  on  political  elites’  bahaviors.  From  a  theoretical 
perspective, the expectation is that a high uncertainty of aid flows (under some assumptions) 
generate a high level of corruption and rent-seeking. 
 
We consider a theoretical reasonning framework where the political leaders (the elites in and 
around  the  government)  are  rent-seekers  (This  assumption  is  strengthenned  by  the 
considerable evidence of rent-seeking activity in many developing economies.) and where aid 
transfers can be the subject of predation and dissipation. Moreover, we assume (from the aid 
flows uncertainty evidence – see section 4.3.2) that the leaders face uncertainty about the 
future of the rents they extract. We thus relax the assumption of a benevolent government 
found  in  the  political  economy  litterature  of  government  spending  and  assume  that  on 
average, aid recipient countries are managed by politicians who draw partial utility from rents 
and who face an uncertainty in the future aid flows. 
 
The intuition of this paper is as follows: in a theoretical setting where politicians aim at 
maximizing the amount of the rent they capture and where they have intertemporal smoothing 
considerations,  a  greater  unpredictability  of  aid  can  lead  them  to  engage  more-than- 
proportionally (as compared with the optimal path) in rent-seeking since they face a risk of a -10- 
 
shortfall of aid. Investigating the political foundations of the negative impact of resources 
booms  on  the  economy  with  a  political  economy  model,  Robinson,  Torvik,  and  Verdier 
(2006)  have  shown  that  politicians  have  the  incentive  to  over-extract  natural  resources 
(generating  rents)  compared  to  the  efficient  extraction  path.  That  is  determined  by  their 
survival probability in power, which is a discount factor of the future. In other words, the less 
certain they will be to stay in power, the more they will have the incentive to over-extract the 
resource and consume the rents. Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2006) explain that the future 
stock of resources (and therefore rents) only matter if the politicians are in power. 
 
The  work  of  Ventelou  (2001)  also  supports  the  point  that  political  risk  determines  the 
incentive of politicians to over-engage in rent-seeking. Considering a government who have 
the choice between investing the public resources in productive goods or appropriating them 
to finance private consumption, he shows that as the probability of the political survival
6
 
decreases, the level of rent capture by politicians increases. The less the government in office 
has a chance to keep the power in the next period, the more he will have the incentive to 
capture the maximum of rents in the current period, the return of the productive investments 
benefitting the next government.    
 
We rely on a similar theoretical reasonning, which is the probability of receiveing the tranfers 
from which the rent is extracted and which determines the behaviors of leaders insofar as one 
can predict that they will tend to be more engaged in rent-seeking when this probability is low 
or unknown. Anticipations and expectations about the future can also be affected, not only by 
the probability of leaders’ survival in power in the future (determining their ability to capture 
the rent) but also by the probability of receiveing the income (foreign aid) from which the rent 
is extracted (determining their ability to capture the rent as well). So, things go as if the rent-
seekers leaders are risk averse, and over-extract the current rent from aid instead of waiting 
for an uncertain amount of future rent. Contrary to Svensson (2000) who shows that the mere 
expectation of foreign aid provides incentives to increase rent dissipation, we suggest that the 
mere  anticipation  of  aid  shortfall  provides  incentives  to  rent-seekers  to  increase  rent 
dissipation.  Acemoglu,  Robinson, and Verdier  (2004) show that  aid  provides kleptocratic 
rulers with  greater resources  to  finance their tenure of power by buying off opponets.  A 
greater uncertainty of such a resource for such leaders would increase their incentive to over-
extract the rent. 
 
This paper’s theoretical reasonning is inspired by the political economy litterature describing 
governments behaviors facing economic and political risk. Battaglini and Coate (2008) study 
the relationship between politicians rent-seeking incentives and public debt and deficits, 
and find that in the presence of (political) risk, rent-seeking government over-extract the rent 
and therefore holds a level of debt which exceeds that of the benevolent government. Myopic 




Does aid fungibility matter? 
 
The  aid  fungibility  paradigm  explains  that  aid  delivered  for  a  project  that  the  recipient 
government would have undertaken anyway could end up financing some other expenditures 
(Devarajan,  Rajkumar,  and  Swaroop,  1999).  A  number  of  studies  has  been  interested  in 
discussing and evidencing the fungibility of aid. While Devarajan, Rajkumar, and Swaroop 
                                                 
6 interpreted as the probability of a re-election in a democracy 
7 Caballero and Yared (2008) evidence the same conclusion in the long term. -11- 
 
(1999) find mixed evidence that aid to Sub-Saharan Africa is fungible, the work of Pack and 
Pack (1993) reaches the opposite conclusion, explaining that in the Dominican Republic, aid 
is  diverted  away  from  its  intended  purposes.  Jha  and  Swaroop  (1998)  focusing  on  aid 
fungibility in India, also found that aid is fungible insofar as it substitutes for spending that 
governments would have undertaken anyway. They also found that when transferring external 
assistance to states, the central government reduces the other transfers to them. Using panel 
data,  Feyzioglu  and  Al  (1998)  evidence  that  except  for  loans  to  the  transport  and 
communication sectors, concessionary loans to agriculture, education and energy sectors lead 
aid-recipient governments to reduce their own resources going to these sectors and to allocate 
it elsewhere. 
 
We argue that aid fungibility could matters in explainning the extra rent-seeking behaviors 
raising from aid unpredictability. As shown by Jha and Swaroop (1998), the funds freed by 
aid  are  spent  on  nondevelopment  activities  in  general  and  administrative  services  in 
particular. From that point, aid fungibility could lead to increased consumption expenditures 
and then to more rent-seeking if the diverted resources are more "exposed" to rent capture. 
The rationale supporting  that aid  fungibility matters  in  explainning the extra rent-seeking 
behaviors raising from aid unpredictability as discussed above, is based on the point that aid 
fungibility all by itself may be a source of rent-seeking behaviors. 
 
Aid unpredictability may also directly increase the fungibility of aid resources. Indeed, as 
explained  in  the  previous  section,  myopic  rent-seekers  politicians  facing  a  risk  prefer  to 
extract the rents as early as possible (Caballero and Yared, 2008). Based on this point, a 




4 Empirical evidence 
 




 for this paper are mainly from the World Bank statistics
9, the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG), the Development Comitte Assistance (DAC) statistics and the Global 
Development Network Growth Database. Our sample is made of 67 developing countries. 
The number of countries is relatively weak due to our desire to have a most balanced possible 
database, for our main variables. The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index of 
corruption is on a scale from 0 to 6. Lower scores indicate that "high government officials are 
likely to demand special payments", "illega l payments are generally expected throughout 
lower levels of government" in the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, 
exchange controls, tax assessment, police protection, or loans." We computed annual values 
of our index of corruption (taken from the ICRG) by taking the average of the 12 monthly 
observations for each year and for each country. The index is provided on a scale from 0 
(worst situation of corruption) to 6 (best situation of corruption). We choose not to rescale the 
index, so an increase means a reduction of corruption. 
 
   
                                                 
8 See Appendix A for data sources and definitions. 
9 World Development Indicators, 2008 -12- 
 
Our main measure of aid intensity is "official development assistance"
10
 scaled by the Gross 
Domestic products (GDP). Even though such measure of aid may reflect changes in GDP 
with  aid  constant,  rather  than  changes  in  aid,  it  does  capture  the  importance  of  aid.  As 
indicated  in  Appendix  A,  aid  data  are  available  from  the  World  Development  Indicators 
(WDI), based on aid data provided by the OECD’s Developement Assistance Committee. We 
also  make use of two  other measures  of aid intensity  for  robustness,  which are aid as  a 
percentage of the Gross National Income (GNI) and as a percentage of total importations (also 
available from the WDI). 
 
Table 1, which presents some basic descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the 
empirical analysis (based on 5 years sub-periods averages), shows that values of aid as a 
percentage of GDP ranges up to 53% (Mozambique). For aid as a percentage of the Gross 
National Income (GNI) and the importations, the figures are higher. The table also shows that 
no country in the sample on the sub-periods means reaches the maximum score indicating the 
best corruption situation (6). The average score of corruption is also relatively low (2.632, on 
a scale from 0 to 6), indicating that the set of developing countries we focuse on in our 
analysis are on average corrupt. 
 
We rely on the litterature on the determinants of corruption to select the remaining controls 
variables. Following Svensson (2000), we use an index of ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
(fractionalization)  as  a  proxy  of  ethnic  diversity.  Ethnolinguistic  fractionalization  (the 
likelihood that two citizens belong to a different ethnic or linguistic group) is assumed to be a 
determinant of corruption as bureaucrats may favor members of their same group (Mauro, 
1995). We also include the level of income (GDP par capita) in our vector of controls, of 
which the net effect on the level of corruption might be ambiguous. A greater level income 
can create more opportunies for rent-seeking as well as go with a reduction of corruption 
since the quality of institutions in a country get better with the level of development. The 
other controls used are: oil exporter (a dummy indicating whether the country is a major oil 
exporter), total  population  (population), initial  income (initial  inc.), legal  origin  dummies 
(british, french, socialist). Sachs and Warner (2001) show that resource-endowed countries 
experience slower growth, partly due to the corruption in the government. Some work suggest 
that  larger  countries  are  over-sampled  in  corruption  indexes,  which  is  a  source  a  sample 
selection biais (Knack and Azfar, 2000). Finally, a country’s colonial history may explain the 
level  of  corruption  since  they  may  have  inherited  inadequate  weak  institutional  systems 
favouring rent-dissipation. We capture that effect with dummies for the origin of the legal 
system. Table 1 reveals considerable variation in income (GDP per capita, constant 2000 
US$)  although  the  variation  is  substantially  larger  accross  countries  than  over  time  (the 




4.2 Aid dependency and corruption: revisitating the causal effect 
 
This section tests against the litterature findings the assumption that high levels of aid have a 
significant  (positive or  negative) effect  on corruption in  recipient  countries.  We carefully 
address the issue of causality when investigating the effect of aid on corruption. Indeed, the 
relationship between foreign assisstance and recipient countries’ domestic institutions is two-
way;  while  aid  could  affect  the  quality  of  these  institutions  as  demonstrated  by  a  huge 
                                                 
10 According to OECD/DAC, "Official Development Assistance" includes grants and loans with a grant element 
of more than 25% 
11 detailed statistics not shown -13- 
 
litterature set, recipient countries’ institutionnal performance might also be a determinant of 
aid in the extent that donors pay attention to that, when allocating their assistance to countries. 
That is an important source of reverse causality bias, covering the true causal effect of aid on 
recipient countries’ institutions. As stressed in the former sections, several empirical studies 
in the litterature fuel the controversy, but it’s worth noting that few of them have succeed in 
properly dealing with the endogeneity of aid. Traditional instrumental variables approaches 
have  focused  on  instruments  taken  from  the  "recipient  side"  (recipient  countries 
characteristics  such  as  population  size  (Hoffman,  2003;  Svensson,  2000;  Knack,  2004; 
Djankov,  Montalvo,  and  Reynal-Querol,  2008),  initial  population  size  (Goldsmith,  2001; 
Brautigam  and  Knack,  2004),  infant  mortality  (Hoffman,  2003;  Knack,  2001,  2004; 
Brautigam and Knack, 2004), level of income (Svensson, 2000; Goldsmith, 2001; Brautigam 
and Knack, 2004), initial level of income (Knack, 2001; Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-
Querol,  2008),  terms-of-trade  (Svensson,  2000),  dummies  for  former  french,  british, 
portuguese or belgian colonies (Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Goldsmith, 2001), dummies for 




Table 1: Descriptive statistics (1984-2004) 
 
Variable   Mean     Std. Dev.   Min.     Max.     N   
   Panel A: Corruption measure   
Corruption (ICRG)  2,632  -0,89  0  5  268 
   Panel B: Aid variables   
Aid(%GDP)  7,578  10,139  -0,02  53,511  268 
Aid(%GNI)  7,752  10,09  -0,02  58,06  267 
Aid(%import)  18,726  23,905  -0,027  133,182  254 
   Panel C: Countries characteristics   
GDP per cap. (2000 cst)  1541,609  1723,463  83,5  8922,924  268 
Urban pop.  45,352  20,576  9,777  92,02  268 
Population (log)  16,32  1,44  12,87  20,77  268 
Trade (%GDP)  66,122  35,887  13,548  226,871  267 
Oil export.  0,119  0,325  0  1  268 
Eth. fract.  51,302  28,865  1  90  252 
Legal orig. (brit.)  0,299  0,458  0  1  268 
Legal orig. (fr.)  0,687  0,465  0  1  268 
Legal orig. (soc.)  0,015  0,121  0  1  268 
Africa  0,478  0,5  0  1  268 




Using such instrumental variables (from the "recipient side") could not be the best way to 
isolate  the  exogeneous  variations  in  aid  since  recipient  countries’  characteristics  such  as 
income,  infant  mortality,  terms-of-trade  are  not  really  exogeneous  to  that  countries’ 
institutions. Countries with weak institutional performances are precisely the poor performers 
ones.  Weak  quality  institutions  lead  to  slower  growth  and  weak  redistributive  policies, 
explaining  that  countries  are  poor  precisely  because  they  have  weak  institutions.  Such 
instruments are admittedly correlated with aid, but as well with the quality of institutions. -14- 
 
Better  instrumental  variables  should  isolate  the  variations  in  aid  due  to  external  factors. 
Tavares (2003) used such instruments to investigate the effect of aid on corruption. Aid from 
the largest donors, weighted by variables capturing cultural and geographical proximity with 
donors was used as instrument. According to this study, when a donor country increases its 
total aid outflows, recipient countries that are culturally and geographically closer to that 
donor exogeneously receive more aid. Alesina and Dollar (2002) also show that aid inflows in 
recipients countries are strongly correlated with cultural and historic proximity with donors, 
while being weakly related to their economic performance. 
 
We use a similar procedure taken from Brun, Chambas, and Guerineau (2008) to construct 
our first set of instruments for aid. First, the five main donors countries are identified for each 
recipient country and each year. Then, the amount of aid (in constant US dollar) from those 
donors  are  weighted  by  the  reverse  bilateral  geographic  distance  between  the  recipient 
countries and Washington (for Canada and the US), Brussels (for european donors), Tokyo 
(for Japan) and Canberra (for Australia and New Zealand). Linguistic and religious proximity 
are repectively proxied by a dummy indicating if there is a common official language between 
the donors and the recipient country and a correlation coeficient between the donor and the 
recipient countries’ religious structure. 
 
Official  Development  Assistance  from  a  country  could  also  be  determined  by  its  public 
finances. The more that finances are good, the more willing is the country to give aid (Faini, 
2006).  Following  this  idea,  our  second  set  of  instrumental  variables  are  made  of:  the 
conventional deficit and the total outstanding debt of the donor (GDP ratios), weighted by the 
reverse bilateral distance from the donor
12. The scatters below give a sens e of the strong 
correlation between aid and some of the constructed instruments for our sample countries. Aid 
inflows in a recipient country seem to be very correlated with the cultural proximity and the 
public finances of its main donors
13. 
   
                                                 
12 See Brun, Chambas, and Guerineau (2008) for details 
13 The same graphical evidence (not shown for reasons of space, but available upon request) comes out 
for the other constructed instruments (cultural proximity regarding religion, aid and grants from the main 

















Figure 1: Aid and donors’ public finances (outstanding debt –GDP ratio–). x axis, countries are represented, y 
left axis, numbers refer to Aid (%GDP) (1984-2004 average), y right axis, numbers refers to the total outstanding 















   
 
 
Figure 2: Aid and donors’ public finances (conventional deficit –GDP ratio–). x axis, countries are represented, y 
left axis, numbers refer to Aid (%GDP) (1984-2004 average), y right axis, numbers refers to the conventional 
















Figure 3: Aid and cultural proximity with donors (common official language). x axis, countries are represented, y 
left axis, numbers refer to  Aid (%GDP) (1984-2004 average),  y right axis, numbers refers to the language 
proximity. -16- 
 
Table 2 presents  results using the  corruption  index as  the dependent  variable, with  cross 
section  data  (1984-2004  average).  Columns  1  and  2  report  respectively  Ordinary  Least 
Squares  (OLS)  and  Two-Stage  Least  Square  (IV)  regression  results,  testing  the  effect  of 
aid/GDP  ratio  on  the  level  of  corruption.  Consistent  with  some  studies  in  the  litterature 
(including  Tavares  (2003)),  a  strong  positive  effect  of  aid  dependency  is  found:  ceteris 
paribus aid decreases corruption. The coefficient of aid increases from .045 to .149 from the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation to the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimation and is 
significant at 5%. These results fail to support the "voracity effect" found in Svensson (2000); 
Alesina and Weder (2002). As underlined above in this section, we make use of a new set of 
instrumental variables suggested by Tavares (2003) and Faini (2006), which are "outside" of 
the recipient countries,  and which seem to be much more convincing than the traditional 
instruments  (infant  mortality,  population  size,  income,  etc.).  We  use  as  instruments  for 
aid/GDP the cultural proximity with the main donors and the quality of their public finances 
as  explained  above.  The  usual  overidentification  statistics  confirms  the  quality  of  the 
instrumental  variables.  The  Hansen  p-value  is  largely  above  .10  and  indicates  that  the 
instruments are good.  
 
Why aid may decrease corruption? If more corrupt countries receive more aid (according to 
the findings of Alesina and Weder (2002)) the effect of aid on corruption is negatively biased 
by  reverse  causation.  According  to  Tavares  (2003),  even  if  aid  is  associated  with  less 
corruption, the fact that less corrupt countries tend to receive less aid biases the size of the 
coefficient, and properly instrumenting for aid uncover the real relationship. Since we build 
upon  his  procedure  to  construct  our  instruments,  this  negative  effect  is  what  we  were 
expecting to get. 
 
The  oil  exporter  dummy,  population  size,  africa  dummy  and  urban  population  enter 
insignificantly in the 2SLS regression. Only ethnolinguistic fractionalization enters counter- 
intuitively with a positive sign (but only at 10%). This result is not expected since the more 
diverse a country is, the more corrupt it should be, according to the litterature (Svensson, 
2000).  Summarizing  the  main  findings,  when  instrumenting  for  aid  with  a  new  set  of 
instrumental variables from "donor side", we find that on average, foreign aid dependency is 





















Table 2: Aid dependency and corruption (cross-section).    
 
Variable   Coefficient (Std. err.)   
   OLS     2SLS   
 Aid(% GDP)     0,045**(0,019)   0,149**(0,077) 
 Log(income)     1,448***(0,447)   2,627***(1,154) 
 Oil export.     0,126 (0,324)     0,956 (0,615)   
 Log(pop.)     0,066 (0,082)     0,245 (0,198)   
 Africa     0,266 (0,244)     0,065 (0,328)   
 Eth. frac.     -0,006 (0,004)     0,20*(0,1) 
 Log(pop. urb.)     0,19*(0.10)   -0,005 (0,005)   
 Intercept     -0.603 (2.133)     -7,915 (5,611)   
 Obs  66  50 
 R
2  0.25  0,92 
   Instruments quality statistics   
 Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic     –    0,893 
 Hansen J statistic     –    1,231 
 Hansen p-value     –    0,873 
 
Beside the coefficient value, the Std. Errors, which are computed using  heteroskedastic-consistent standard deviations, are reported in 





4.3 Aid unpredictability and corruption 
 
4.3.1 Measuring aid unpredictability 
 
Economic  uncertainty  has  been  widely  studied  in  the  economic  development  litterature. 
Several  studies  have  investigated  the  empirical  relationship  between  macroeconomic 
uncertainty and other economic variables. From a statistical viewpoint, uncertainty over an 
economic variable is in most of the studies proxied by unconditional measures such as the 
standard  deviation  or  the  variance  of  the  variable’s  movements.  It’s  worthy  to  note  that 
simply  using  such  proxies  is  questionable  on  both  economic  and  statistical  grounds. 
Variability does not necessarily imply unpredictability. As underlined by Knack (2001) when 
estimating the effect of aid volatility (using the coefficient of variation of aid) on the quality 
of governance, a high variability of aid should not be linked to uncertainty since it could be 
the result of a strong and steady upward or downward trend in aid levels over time. Dehn 
(2000)  also  points  out  that  simply  using  the  standard  deviation  of  a  series  to  proxy  it’s 
uncertainty yield to overestimate the unpredictable part and underestimate the predictable part 
since the variable’s trend is not taken into account. A high volatility can be anticipated or not 
and what  matter from a political  economy prospect  is  unpredictability. A political  leader 
facing a bad-contained risk is not expected to have the same behavior than another one who 
has much more information on the future movement of a variable. So conditional measures of 
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 are well fitted to estimate uncertainty. The variance of aid conditional on the 
information available in the past periods is specified to follow this GARCH (p,q) model: 
 
 





t denotes the variance of the residuals ʵ from the forecasting equation conditional on 
information up to period t. i stands for the countries and t for the time. The fitted σ
2
it from the 
equation above is then taken as the measure of uncertainty. 
However, GARCH-based aproaches are most appropriate with high frequency data, which are 
not  available  to  us.  We  then  make  use  of  alternative  measures  of  uncertainty,  following 
Aizenman and Marion (1993) and Lensink and Morrissey (2000) and consisting of two steps. 
First  we  estimate  the  following  forecasting  equation  specified  as  a  second-order 




     (2) 
 
where Aid is total Official Development Assistance net disbursements, ν is the forecast error, 
T is a time trend, i stands for individual countries and t for the years. We then measure aid 
uncertainty  by  calculating  for  each  country  in  our  sample  and  for  each  subperiod
16  the 
standard  deviations  of  the  residuals  of  equation  equation  2.  This  measure  of  aid 
unpredictability measure is intended to separate simple variation from uncertainty and thus to 




4.3.2 How unpredictable is aid? 
 
The scatters below present the evolution of the aid forecasts errors over the period 1982- 
2001, for a set of 12 countries out of our sample
17, which are the most aid -dependent (the 
dependecy ratio used is net ODA/GDP). These countries are Comoros, Djibouti, Guyana, 
Honduras, Liberia, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Malawi, Niger, 
Rwanda,  Sierra  Leone,  Zambia,  Uganda,  Tanzania  and  Chad.  The  errors  forecasts  are 
computed from the equation 2. The x axis represents year and the y axis the residuals of which 
the variability is considered as a proxy of aid uncertainty. The scatters show that for all the 
selected countries, the residuals vary a lot around zero, and computations indicate that the 








                                                 
14 See Bollerslev (1986); Engle (1982) 
15 It is also possible to iclude a quadratic form of the trend and to estimate the model in difference 
16 Our data are computed as two ten-years periods averages 
17 figure 5 -19- 
 


































Figure 4: High aid-dependent countries’ net ODA errors forecasts. (Author) 
 
 
4.3.3 The identification strategy 
 
Baseline estimations and results 
 
In  order  to  investigate  the  effect  of  aid  unpredictability  on  corruption,  we  specify  the 
following equation: 
 
  (3) 
 
where  corruption  is  the  average  level  of  rent-seeking  (proxied  by  the  ICRG  index  of 
corruption) in period t
18
 for country i, Aidit is foreign aid, uncert is a proxy variable of aid 
unpredictability, X is a vector of controls including income, oil exporter dummy, population 
size, urbanization, etholinguistic fractionalization, legal origin and an africa dummy. i stands 
                                                 
18 Data are averaged over four periods: 1984-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999 and 2000-2004. -20- 
 
for countries and t for the periods. τ is a time trend. Consistent with section 4.2, the models 
suggest that Aid should be treated as an endogeneous variable and we instrument for it using 
the same set of instrumental variables. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the results using ICRG averaged index of corruption as the dependent 
variable.  All  the  three  columns  report  two-stage  least  squares  (2SLS)  regression  results, 
testing the effects of aid unpredictability on corruption. All our regressions include regional 
fixed effects to take into account the unobserved heterogeneity accross regions. In all the 
specifications,  the  aid  coefficients  are  positive  and  significant  at  5%,  confirming  that  on 
average, other things being equal, aid decreases coruption. As expected, we found that aid 
unpredictability increases rent-seeking proxied by corruption in a statistically significative 
way. A one percent increase in the aid uncertainty measure is associated with a .17 percent 
increase in corruption index. From column 1 to columns 2 and 3, we gradually include in the 
regression additional controls that are legal origin, urbanization and an Africa dummy, which 
are supposed to have a effect on corruption. All of them enter insignificantly and do not 
change the aid and uncertainty coefficients size and significativity. Income is found to have a 
positive and significant effect (at 10% in the specification with all controls) on the index of 
corruption, supporting that higher income is associated with more corruption. This result call 
for some comments. One would have expected the opposite effect. Indeed if good quality 
institutions  are  considered  as  a  "superior  good",  higher  income  should  favor  them 
(Lipset1959, Acemoglu2008). This regression result is probably due to a sample bias. Our 
sample countries is made of developing countries, having on average bad institutions. Finding 
with  a  such  sample  that  the  higher  that  income  is,  the  higher  there  is  corruption  is  not 
surprising because when income increases in these countries there are more opportunities for 
corruption because of the weak quality of institutions. 
 
Table 5 presents results using cross-section data (average over the 1984-2004 period) and 
shows that the previous findings are not very sensitive to such a change in the data structure. 
Using averaged data over the whole period of the study in order to focus on the "between" 
variation  of  corruption,  we  found  that  aid  uncertainty  keep  being  harmful  in  terms  of 
corruption, whereas aid reduces it. The first column shows the effect of aid unpredictability 
on corruption  without any  control  variable. The coefficient of the uncertainty measure is 
negative and significant at 1%, albeit being very weak. This regression gives a basic sense of 
the effect of aid uncertainty on corruption, but fail to have a good explanatory power (R
2
 is 
only about .09). The second column of the table shows regression results controling for the 
other determinants of corruption. The coefficient of the aid uncertainty variable is about .26 
and is significant at 5% . Out of the controls, only the size of the population proves to be 
significant at 5%, while having a counterintuitive sign. The R
2
 of .92 is reasonably high for a 






















Table 3: Aid unpredictability and corruption (time-series cross section) 
 
Variable  Coefficient (Std. err.) 
  2SLS  2SLS  2SLS 
Uncertainty   -0.18**(.0859)   -.174**  (.0841)   -.1611**(.0772) 
Aid(% GDP)   .171**  (.081)   .168**  (.0794)   .158**  (.0733) 
Log(income)   .728**  (.394)   .715* (.3861)   .734* (.393) 
Oil export.  .153 (.389)  .132 (.3838)  .1685 (.3769) 
Log(pop.)  .203 (.1608)  .195 (.1566)  .192 (.1498) 
Eth. frac.  -.00655 (.0051)  -.0061 (.0051)  -.0055 (.0048) 
british    -.084 (.2374)  -.0955 (.2311) 
Log(pop. urb.)      -.0040 (.008) 
Africa      -.482 (.4981) 
Intercept  -7.27 (5.29)  -7.048 (5.16)  -6.90 (4.93) 
regional dummies  yes  yes  yes 
Obs  142  142  142 
R
2  0.884  0.886  0.895 
   Instruments quality statistics 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  3.131  3.195  3.427 
Hansen/Sargant J statistic  0.005  0.029  0.133 
p-value  0.94  0.8641  0.7158 
 
Beside  the  coefficient  value, the  Std. Errors,  which  are  computed  using  heteroskedastic-consistent  standard  deviations are  reported  in 
parentheses. *** Denotes significance at the 1 percent level whereas ** and * Denote significance at the 5 percen and 10 percent levels 
respectiveley. All the estimations include regional controls, which are not reported for reasons of space. 
 
 
Dealing with the potential endogeneity of the uncertainty variable 
 
 
The previous results could suffer from error measurement bias in the uncertainty variable we 
used following Aizenman and Marion (1993) and Lensink and Morrissey (2000). 
Pagan and Ullah (1988) proposed a Instrumental Variable (IV) non-parametric estimor, with 
instruments constructed from the information set. 
The conditional variance of aid is taken as the unobserved volatility of aid and can be written 
as: 
 
        
(4)         
where varprev() and Eprev() are respectively the expectation and the variance conditional on the 
previous time period information. From equation 2, we can write that
19: 
 
              
(5) 
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So, equation 4 can be rewritten as: 
                  
(6) 
 
To account for the potential endogeneity of the uncertainty variable, we first re-estimate aid 
uncertainty with a nonparametric estimator, which takes advantage of the yearly availability 
of aid data and the period-based structure we give to our data
20. The estimator was introduced 
by Schwert and Seguin (1990) and used in Andersen and Bollerslev  (1998). The unobserved 
variability of aid in equation 5 is estimated with: 
 
 




where Atip is aid residuals from the forecasting equation in year t and period p for country i. 
This  estimator  has  been  demonstrated  to  be  consistent  for  a  general  conditional  variance 
specification for cases where t are high (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1998). Contrary to these 
authors who estimated daily exchange-rate volatility from intraday returns, we estimate aid 
volatility  for  each  period  and  each  country  using  yearly  data.  Ten-years  periods  is  the 
structure giving the highest frequency of aid data while keeping a panel structure. 
We then rely on the Pagan and Ullah (1988) instrumental variable, which correct for the large 
sample bias due to the weak number of subintervals (10 years). The first step of the procedure 
consists  in  proxying  σ
2
it  (the  residuals  from  equation  4)  with  A
2
it,  since  Eprev(A
2
it)  =  σ
2
it 
(equation 5). Our baseline regression equation is then rewritten as:  
 
 








it). The proxy A
2
it being correlated with ηit and assuming that  
E(A
2
it• ζit) = 0, Pagan and Ullah (1988) show that : 
 
 
           (9) 
 
The  second  step  of  the  instrumental  procedure  consists  in  instrumenting  A
2
it  with  ˆ  it
2  (in 
equation 6), which is computed with a set of information correlated with σ
2
it  This procedure 
has an additional advantage in that  ˆ  it
2 should be quite strongly correlated with σ
2
it  in spite of 
the weak number of subintervalls (10 years in our case). We checked and confirmed that with 
our sample data. 
 
Table  4  presents  the  results  of  the  regression  using  the  instrumented  measure  of  aid  
unpredictability. Uncertainty and aid still enter significantly, respectively with a negative and 
positive sign. The new coefficient of the uncertainty variable is lower and about .0057 while 
aid’s one is a bit larger and about .224. Income level keeps increasing corruption, with a 
                                                 
20 For this purpose, we averaged our data over the 1984-1994 and 1995-2004 ten-years periods -23- 
 
coefficient  of  1.56  significant  at  1%.  The  oil  exporter  dummy  enters  positively  and 
significantly, supporting the hypothesis that is oil production is a source of rents favoring 





Table 4: Aid unpredictability and corruption (times series cross-section, instrumenting 
for unpredictability) 
 
Variable  Coefficient (Std. err.) 
  2SLS 
Uncertainty   -.0057** (.0028) 
Aid(% GDP)   .224*** (.092) 
Log(income)   1.56*** (.528) 
british   -.395 (.339) 
Oil export.   .943** (.451) 
Log(pop.)   .3736* (.225) 
Africa   -.636 (.543) 
Eth. frac.   -.0043 (.0057) 
Log(pop. urb.)   -.466 (.452) 
Intercept   -13.93* (7.33) 
Obs  94 
R
2  0.855 
Instruments quality statistics 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  0.820 
Hansen J statistic  1.253 
Hansen p value  0.939 
 
Beside  the  coefficient  value, the  Std. Errors,  which  are  computed  using  heteroskedastic-consistent  standard  deviations are  reported  in 
parentheses. *** Denotes significance at the 1 percent level whereas ** and * Denote significance at the 5 percen and 10 percent levels 
respectiveley. All the estimations include regional controls, which are not reported for reasons of space. Data are averaged over two ten-




4.3.4 Sensivity analysis and discussion 
 
We conducted several sensitivity analysis. We already shown that the results are robust to the 
use  of  a  different  structure  of  data  (cross-section  dataset  versus  panel  dataset).  Another 
important question is about their sensitivity regarding the use of different types of aid. We 
broke up aid into loans versus grants, bilateral versus multilateral and project versus program. 
Table 6 in Appendix C presents the results. The first two columns (loans versus grants) show 
that the effect of aid unpredictability does not seem to vary from loans to grants, even thought 
the coefficient for grants are more significant (1%). Aid/GDP ration have a greater (positive) 
effect on corruption, with a coefficient of .56 for loans.  
 
The third and the fourth columns reveal that multilateral aid unpredictability has a greater 
negative effect (coefficient is about .263 and significant at 1%) on corruption as compared 
with bilateral aid uncertainty (coefficient is about .137 and significant at 1%). This result is -24- 
 
consistent  with  the  work  of  Pallage  and  Robe  (2001)  who  shown  that  the  instability  of 
multilateral aid is greater than for bilateral aid (both net receipts and commitments), even 
though volatily does not necessarily mean unpredictability. 
 
The  three  last  columns  of  the  table  show  the  evidence  for  program  aid,  project  aid  and 
financial program aid. Based on data from 37 IMF desk economists, the work of Bulir and 
Hamann  (2003)  mentions  that  program  aid  is  more  unpredictable  than  project  aid.  The 
regression results in columns 5 and 6 seem to be consistent with that point. The coefficient of 
program  aid unpredictability is  about .22 and is larger than the coefficient of project aid 
unpredictability.  Both  are  significant  at  10%.  Financial  program  aid  unpredictability  is 
however not significant. All our overidentification tests statistics indicate that the instruments 
for aid are good. 
 
In table 7, we test the robustness of our findings to the use of different measures of aid. 
Columns (1) and (2) respectivey show regression results for Aid/GNI and Aid/Importations 
ratios.  Aid  unpredictability  still  enters  negatively  and  significantly  and  Aid/GDP  ratio 
significantly positively for both measures of aid. The coefficient of Aid/GNI unpredictability 
(.235)  is  larger  than  the  one  of  Aid/importations  unpredictability,  which  is  about  .144. 
Consistent with previous findings, the income level and the oil exporter dummy increase 
corruption. The Africa dummy enters negatively (even though weakly significant), meaning 
that on average, the african countries in our sample are more corrupt. 
 
Our main results call for some comments. We have found that aid is on average associated 
with less corruption, indicating that aid decreases corruption; meanwhile, aid unpredictability 
has  been  found  to  increase  corruption.  The  first  result  is  consistent  with  the  litterature 
(Tavares, 2003) promoting the use of new instrumental variables from donors side (and no 
longer  instruments  based  on  recipients  needs  that  are  probably  correlated  with  their 
insitutional performances), and allowing to uncover the real relationship between aid  and 
corruption. Tavares (2003) explains that the "conditionality" and "liquidity" effects of aid can 
partly explain that effect. The "conditionality" effect operates through the rules and conditions 
(from the donor) going with aid regarding political reforms
21. The "liquidity" effect of aid 
takes  place  by  alleviating  public  revenues  shortages   and  by  allowing  public  sectors  to 
implement reforms. However, how can aid decrease corruption while aid unpredictabilty 
increases it? We relied on a political economy approach to explain that aid shares some 
common characteristics with rents from natural  resources and how this could be a source a 
rent-seeking activities from the political leaders. Aid would succeed in limiting rent -seeking 
through donor’s conditions, but other things being equal, in case of unpredictability of aid, 
[corrupt] leaders get incentives or extra incentives to engage in rent-seeking activities. These 
empirical results suggest that the uncertainty of aid weaken the "conditionality" effect. In a 
theoretical framework where aid aims to "buy" political and institutional reforms, the stability 
and the predictability of aid matter. By being unpredictable, aid would fail to keep recipient 
governments  committed to  reform.  Moreover, aid  uncertainty also  obviously weakens  the 
"liquidity"  effect  by  failing  to  provide  recipient  governments  with  stable  resources.  As  a 
results, rent-seeking activities and corruption increase. 
 
 
Some implications for the African Development Bank Group’s strategy 
                                                 
21 This type of conditionality has been critized in the litterature. See Collier, Guillaumont, Guillaumont 
Jeanneney, and Gunning (1997) -25- 
 
 
The African Development Bank Group has been taking important steps to combat corruption 
and rent-seeking through governance initiatives for some years. Indeed, between 2000 and 
2006,  the  Bank  Group  invested  2.5  billion  US  dollars  to  strengthen  African  governance 
structures  and  institutional  capacity
22.  In may 2008, the Bank launched his Governance 
Strategic Directions and Action Plan (GAP) for the period 2008-2012 in order to help member 
countries improve their governance performances and reduce corruption.  The Bank has also 
committed with other multilateral and bilateral donors to improve the management and the 
delivery of aid, with the aim to improve the long -term predictability of aid. The findings of 
this study connect well these two large initatives sinc e evidence has been made that aid 
unpredictability  can  provide  incentives  for  rent -seeking  on  top  of  having  adverse 
macroeconomic effects (making fiscal planing difficult, complicating the implementation of 
development agenda difficult for aid dependent co untries, increasing fiscal and monetary 
instability, etc.).  
 
The  Bank’s  anti-corruption  initatives  are  concentrated  around  the  prevention  and  the 
controling  of  corruption  in  Bank-financed  projects  and  programs,  the  reducing  of  the 
opportunities  for  rent-seeking  and  corrupt  practices,  the  support  of  civil  society  capacity 
building, the policy dialogue and the sensitization of the Regional Member Countries in order 
to assist their efforts at combating corruption (Governance Strategic Directions and Action 
Plan (GAP) 2008-2012). As the Bank puts it, there is a strong need for developing countries 
to have stronger public sector institutions and improved country systems for the management 
of public resources, that will contribute to strenghten states capacity, civil societies and to 
improve accountability and transparency. 
From  a  policy  point  of  view,  the  findings  from  this  paper  imortantly  appear  to  be  a 
supplementary  advocacy  for  the  Bank  to  keep  committed  in  aid  delivery  improvement 
programs and to pursue it’s governance initiatives; Improving performance-based allocation 
systems by prioritizing the countries that have good governance in place is a good policy 
option that need to be fostered. Putting an emphasis on cooperation and coordination with 
other multilateral donors is also of great importance. 
 
 
5 Concluding remarks and policy implications 
 
Recently  a  number  of  studies  have  emphasized  the  need  to  improve  aid  predictability, 
focusing their analysis  on the macroeconomics effects  of aid  unpredictability in  recipient 
countries and particularly in high aid dependent countries. This paper adressed the issue of 
foreign assistance uncertainty from a political economy prospect, by investigating the effect 
of aid unpredictability on rent-seeking behaviors in aid recipient countries. We proxied rent-
seeking activities by corruption mainly due to the weak availability of data and to the fact that 
corruption  is  one  of  the  main  symptoms  of  rent-seeking  activities.  Consistent  with  the 
litterature, statistical  analysis in  the paper  evidences  a high unpredictability of  aid  flows, 
computed from a forecasting econometric model. Our major empirical findings are threefold: 
(1) there is a robust statistical relationship between aid unpredictability and corruption in aid 
recipients countries; (2) there is a similarly strong relationship between higher levels of aid 
and a lower corruption, particularly when we correct for endogeneity; and (3) the effect of aid 
unpredictability on corruption varies from project aid to program aid, the latter effect being a 
bit more severe.  
                                                 
22 Governance Strategic Directions and Action Plan for 2008-2012 -26- 
 
Findings of this analysis suggest that donors must keep on improving the management and the 
delivery of aid flows, since on top of complicating the fiscal planning and the implementation 
of  the  development  agenda  in  aid-dependent  countries,  aid  unpredictability  might  have  a 
detrimental  effect  on  institutions  through  increased  corruption.  However  the  policy 
implications must be phrased delicately. Aid predictability need to be improved not with the 
intention  to  reduce  corruption,  but  with  the  aim  to  reduce  the  negative  macroeconomic 
consequences in countries dependent on aid inflows. The unpredictabilty of aid is associated 
with higher corruption not because it directly causes corruption, but because the political 
institutions are weak. Increased rent-seeking activities resulting from uncertainty is aid flows 
should rather be interpreted as a symptom of weak institutions and weak checks and balances 
on the political power. This is an avenue for futur researches. Coming back to development 
funding  strategies  options,  if  the  policy  option  to  invest  directly  in  the  improvement  of 
institutions and to make aid an instrument of such an investment plan is retained, this paper 
then  provides  supplementary  recommendations  to  improve  the  predictability  of  aid  since 
building and improving institutions through time require stable and sustained ressources. 
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A Data definition and sources 
 
Official development assistance (ODA), total net disbursements include grants and loans 
with a grant element of more than 25%. (Source: OECD/DAC). 
Uncertainty: see section 4.3.1 for calculation details( Sources: Author’s calculation). 
Aid%GDP): ODA measured as a percentage of GDP( Sources: Author’s calculation from 
OECD/DAC aid statistics and World Development Indicators 2008). 
Loans: net ODA loans, current US$ millions (Source: OECD/DAC statistics). 
Grants: ODA grants, current US$ millions (Source: OECD/DAC statistics). 
Multilateral aid: ODA from multilateral donors, current US$ millions (Source: OECD/DAC 
statistics). 
Bilateral  aid:  ODA  from  bilateral  donors,  current  US$  millions  (Source:  OECD/DAC 
statistics). 
Project aid: total net of project ODA, current US$ millions (Source: Ouattara (2005)). 
Programme aid: total net of programme ODA, current US$ millions (Source: Ouattara  
(2005)). 
Financial  programme  aid:  total  net  of  programme  ODA  minus  food  aid,  current  US$ 
millions (Source: Ouattara (2005)). 
APD%GNI:  Aid  (%  of  gross  capital  formation).  Aid  includes  both  official  development 
assistance (ODA) and official aid. Ratios are computed using values in U.S. dollars converted 
at official exchange rates. (Source: OECD/DAC statistics and World Bank estimates). 
APD%imp.:  Aid  (%  of  imports  of  goods  and  services).  Aid  includes  both  official 
development assistance (ODA) and official aid. Ratios are computed using values in U.S. 
dollars converted at official exchange rates.(Source: World Development Indicators 2007 ). 
Income: gross domestic product (GDP) divided by midyear population (constant 2000 US$) 
(Source: Word Development Indicators 2008). 
Corruption: indicator of corruption as reported by international consultants. Scaled from 0 to 
6, higher values denote less corruption(Source: International Country Risk Guide). 
Eth. Frac.: the probability that two random selected individuals within the country belong to 
the same religious and ethnic group (Source : Atlas Narodov Mira). 
Oil  exporter:  dummy  taking  the  value  1  for  oil  exporting  countries  (Source  :  World 
Development Indicators, 2008). 
Legal origin: origin of country legal system. Dummy variables taking the value 1 for each 
British, French and 0 otherwise (Source: Global Development Network Growth Database). 
Population: population, total (Source : World Development Indicators, 2008). 
Urban population: urban population (% of total). Urban population refers to people living in 
urban areas as defined by national statistical offices (Source : World Development Indicators, 
2008). 
Africa: dummy taking the value 1 for african countries (Source: author). 
Regions:  dummies  indicating  whether  the  country  is  part  of  East  Asia  and  Pacific,  East 
Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Sub-saharan Africa or 






B The sample countries 
 
1. Angola     16. Egypt     31. Jordan     46. Pakistan     61. Uganda   
 2. Argentina     17. Ethiopia     32. Kenya     47. Panama     62. Uruguay   
 3. Burkina Faso     18. Gabon     33. Liberia     48. Peru     63. Venezuela   
 4. Bolivia     19. Ghana     34. Sri Lanka     49. Philippines     64. Vietnam   
 5. Brazil     20. Guinea     35. Morocco     50. Papua New Guinea     65. Congo Dem. Rep.   
 6. Botswana     21. Gambia     36. Madagascar     51. Sudan     66. Zambia   
 7. Chile     22. Guinea-Bissau     37. Mexico     52. Senegal     67. Zimbabwe   
 8. Cote d’Ivoire     23. Guatemala     38. Mali     53. Sierra Leone       
 9. Cameroon     24. Guyana     39. Mozambique     54. El Salvador       
 10. Congo (Rep.)     25. Honduras     40. Malawi     55. Suriname       
 11. Colombia     26. Haiti     41. Malaysia     56. Syria       
 12. Costa Rica     27. Indonesia     42. Niger     57. Togo       
 13. Dominican Rep.     28. India     43. Nigeria     58. Thailand       
 14. Algeria     29. Iran     44. Nicaragua     59. Tunisia       












C Additionnal results 
 
Table 5: Aid unpredictability and corruption (cross-section) 
 
Variable  Coefficient (Std. err.) 
  2SLS  2SLS 
Uncertainty   -0.045*** (0.019)   -.260** (.125) 
Aid(% GDP)     .259*** (.100) 
Log(income)     1.123 (.838) 
british     -.131 (.363) 
Oil export.     .799 (.505) 
Log(pop.)     .311** (.158) 
Africa    .055 (.286) 
Eth. frac.     -.00021 (.0049) 
Log(pop. urb.)     .0484 (.338) 
Intercept      -11.01** (5.38) 
Obs  67  47 
R
2  0.09  0.92 
  Instruments quality statistics 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic   -  0.445 
Hansen J statistic   -  3.871 
Hansen p value   -  0.568 
Beside the coefficient value, the Std. Errors, which are computed using heteroskedastic-consistent standard deviations are reported in  
parentheses. *** Denotes significance at the 1 percent level whereas ** and * Denote significance at the 5 percen and 10 percent levels 
respectiveley. All the estimations include regional controls, which are not reported for reasons of space. -34- 
 
Table 6: Aid unpredictability and corruption (time-series cross section, by aid types (2SLS)) 
 
Variable  Coefficient (Std. err.) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
  Loans  grants  bilateral  multilateral  project  prog.  fin. prog. 
Uncertainty  -.187 *(.1108)   -.1692 ***(.062)   -.1379 ***(.038)   -.2637 ***(.121)   -.164 *(.090)   -.222 *(.131)   -.186 (.131)  
Aid(% GDP)  .568 ***(.243)   .171 ***(.0684)   .1942 ***(.0656)   .212 ***(.092)   .224 *(.132)   .267 *(.150)   .310 (.196)  
Log(income)  .588 **(.276)   .8841 ***(.3507)   .7639 ***(.2657)   .374 (.2302)   .786 **(.393)   .428 **(.210)   .355 *(.194)  
Oil export.  .333 (.289)   .6210 ***(.2797)   .5134 **(.2421)   .0363 (.347)   .064 (.367)   -.151 (.304)   -.117 (.286)  
Log(pop.)  .0348 (.1101)   .0583 (.1118)   .0469 (.087)   -.0298 (.086)   .200 (.1507)   .054 (.096)   .060 (.0939)  
Eth. frac.  -.0108 (.0049)   -.0080 *(.0045)   -.0075 (.0045)   .0019 (.0055)   -.012 ***(.004)   -.016 ***(.004)   -.016 ***(.004)  
british  -.3105 (.348)   -.3383 (.3104)   -.0423 (.2108)   -.0311 (.2611)   .138 (.298)   .098 (.2605)   -.0185 (.261)  
Log(pop. urb.)  .526 (.419)   -.6422 (.465)   -.2977 (.306)   .3763 (.344)   -.134 (.347)   -.3069 (.365)   -.356 (.389)  
Africa  -.345 (.337)   -.5903 (.3819)   -.3919 (.356)   -.493 (.482)   -.1151 (.366)   -.177 (.419)   -.044 (.455)  
Intercept  -4.22 (4.10)   -2.11 (3.737)   -2.56 (3.07)   -2.60 (3.02)   -5.71 (5.389)   .451 (2.445)   1.153 (2.199)  
regional dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Obs  163  163  163  125  126  126  126 
R
2  0.855  0.864  0.906  0.905  0.893  0.894  0.897 
Instruments quality statistics 
Cragg-D. Wald F stat  1.855  1.863  3.210  1.96  2.830  5.702  5.630 
Hansen/Sarg. J stat.  2.747  3.016  3.903  7.29  0.801  2.237  3.265 
p value  0.6010  0.3891  0.2722  0.199  0.3707  0.1347  0.070 
 
Beside the coefficient value, the Std. Errors, which are computed using heteroskedastic-consistent standard deviations are reported in parentheses. *** Denotes significance at the 1 percent level whereas ** and * 






Table 7: Aid uncertainty and corruption (aid types, robustness). 
 
Variable  Coefficient (Std. err.) 
  (1)  (2) 
  Aid(%GNI)  Aid(%import.) 
Uncertainty   -.235** (.127)   -.144** (.064) 
Aid(% GDP)   .190* (.096)   .1002*** (.034) 
Log(income)  .893*** (.385)   .840*** (.310) 
Oil export.   .986** (.484)   1.343***(.496) 
Log(pop.)   .048 (.114)   -.040 (.079) 
Africa   -.768* (.468)   -.403 (.442) 
Eth. frac.   -.010* (.0053)   -.0099 (.0052) 
Log(pop. urb.)   .0626 (.460)   1.038* (.577) 
Intercept   -4.992 (4.648)   -7.24 (4.52) 
Obs  137  134 
R
2  0.861  0.892 
  Instruments quality statistics 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic  1.367  2.056 
Hansen J statistic  6.124  4.903 
Hansen p value  0.1901  0.4279 
Beside the coefficient value, the Std. Errors, which are computed using heteroskedastic-consistent standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 
*** Denotes significance at the 1 percent level whereas ** and * Denote significance at the 5 percen and 10 percent levels respectiveley. All the 
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